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Abstract—The cloud model allows many enterprises able to
outsource computing resources at an affordable price without
having to commit the expense upfront. Although the cloud
providers are responsible for the security of the cloud, there are
still many security concerns due to inherently complex model the
cloud providers operate on (e.g.,multi-tenancy). In addition, the
enterprises whose services have migrated into the cloud have
a preference for their own cybersecurity situation awareness
capability on top of the security mechanisms provided by the
cloud providers. In this way, the enterprises can monitor the
performance of the security offerings of the cloud and have a
choice to decide and select potential response strategies more
appropriate to the enterprise in the presence of the attack
where the defense provided by the cloud doesn’t work for
them. However, some response strategies, such as Moving Target
Defense (MTD) techniques shown to be effective to secure cloud,
cannot be deployed by the enterprise themselves. In this paper, we
propose a framework that enables better collaboration between
enterprises and cloud providers. Our proposed framework, which
offers more in-depth security analysis based on the set of most
advanced security metrics, allows the security experts of the
enterprise to obtain better situational awareness in the cloud.
With better and more effective situation awareness of cloud
security, our framework can support better decision making
and further allows to deploy more appropriate threat responses
to protect the outsourced resources. We also propose a secure
protocol which can facilitate more secure communication between
the enterprises and cloud provider. Using our proposed secure
protocol, which is based on authentication and key exchange
mechanism, the enterprises can send a secure request to the
cloud provider to perform a selected defensive strategy.
Index Terms—Situation Awareness; Moving Target Defense;
Security Analysis; Security Metrics; Authentication; Key Ex-
change
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a powerful and affordable network
paradigm providing the computational and storage require-
ments of individuals, enterprises, or governments. Many orga-
nizations decide to outsource their infrastructures and under-
lying services to the cloud to save untested up front expense.
However, there exist many security concerns for the third-
party owned and operated the cloud environment where many
details of the cloud operation are unknown for clients [1],
[2]. The first issue is that cloud computing is a multi-tenant
environment hosting various virtual machines (VMs) in the
shared infrastructures, such as physical hosts (Servers). Such
feature may enable adversaries to find vulnerabilities and
launch various attacks (e.g., Side-channel attack [3], [4]).
The second problem is that cloud providers do not usually
undertake security analysis and evaluation for the Software
Defined Networks (SDN) or Virtual Networks (VN) created
by customers on the cloud infrastructures and only rely on
their own security mechanisms (e.g., firewalls and Intrusion
Detection System (IDS)).
Situation Awareness (SA) systems can be used by cloud’s
customers to monitor their infrastructure in the cloud and
gain awareness of the current and future security posture
of their assets in the cloud. Although cloud providers have
their own security mechanisms to protect the clients’ assets,
the organizations would need to have their own security SA
platform including situation monitoring, situation modeling
and analysis to improve their security posture. They may also
need to have their own decision making and response selection
to defend against possible threats.
Situation Awareness in cybersecurity includes the seminal
aspects [5], as shown in Fig. 1: (i) Situation perception
which involves awareness of the threats and vulnerabilities
on the system which can provide the system administrator
with a low level of understanding on the current situation. It
includes data collection through various sources such as fire-
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walls and vulnerability scanners, and so fourth. (ii) Situation
comprehension which includes cloud risk assessment, attack
and cost assessments, and so forth which provide a higher
understanding or awareness of the current situation (security
posture). (iii) Situation Projection including awareness of how
the situation may further evolve and can further affect the
system. This provides the highest level of situation awareness.
It deals with more in depth analysis of the current situation and
decision-making based on the impact analysis of the possible
responses. It also deals with the effectiveness of the responses
or countermeasures.
Some Moving Target Defense (MTD) techniques (such as
Virtual Machine Live Migration (VM-LM)) have been shown
to be useful defensive strategies to secure the cloud computing
as they can increase the security of the cloud by increasing
the attackers time and effort through changing the attack
surface. [6], [7], [8]. For instance, deploying VM-LM can
improve cloud’s security, decrease risk and attack success
probability, and thwart VM co-residency attacks [9], [10].
However, VM-LM technique is usually restricted for cloud
users and can only be performed by the cloud providers due
to load balancing and security consideration of the cloud
providers [11]. As VM-LM can not be performed directly by
the clients, alternatively, the security experts of the organisa-
tions can send a request to the cloud providers to deploy the
requested defensive strategy.
Proposing a secure platform to enable the security experts
of the organizations to monitor and analyze the cloud security
posture and obtain situation awareness themselves alongside
with the cloud providers’ security mechanism can increase the
cloud’s trustworthiness. Thus, the cooperation of the cloud
providers and enterprises to secure the cloud environment can
be beneficial for both parties. In this paper, we propose a
framework with a secure protocol that enables organizations
to monitor cloud and perform security analysis such as risk
assessment for their network on the cloud and also select
a defensive response strategy which can be either simply
patching vulnerabilities or deploying proactive responses such
as MTD techniques. However, deploying MTD techniques
such as VM-LM approach may have various advantages: (i)
mitigating the possibilities of co-residency problems such as
side-channel attack for the Virtual Machines (VMs) located
into the cloud. (ii) increasing the attack hardening due to
changing the attack surface and make it unpredictable for the
attackers, (iii) reducing the cloud risk values by adjusting the
best MTD deployment scenario. Thus, it is important to mon-
itor the cloud security situation based on the vulnerabilities
existing in the cloud to perceive the threats and then analyze
the cloud’s security posture (such as risk assessment) to obtain
more comprehensive situation awareness of the cloud. Finally,
make a decision about the best response plan which increases
the security benefits and decreases the negative impacts on
the cloud before choosing any MTD techniques to deploy.
Fig. 1 shows the situation awareness phases showing the SA
levels. Selecting an appropriate response strategy can help the
enterprises to reduce or hold the cloud risk on an acceptable
threshold.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• We propose a security situation awareness platform to
monitor the assets in the cloud and discover the threats
involved to gain the situation perception and analyze the
current situation of the cloud in terms of cloud risk for the
enterprises migrated into the cloud to gain the situation
comprehension.
• We include the situation projection and response in to
the proposed SA system which enables the enterprises to
perform further analysis on the current situation gained
and make a decision about the available responses and the
effects of each on the cloud by evaluating the defensive
strategies like vulnerability patching or VM-LM;
• Then, we propose a client-server based communication
protocol including a key exchange scheme for setting up
a secure communication between the enterprises’ servers
outside of the cloud and the cloud provider in order to
deploy VM-LM as the main MTD technique on the cloud
through sending a secure request to the cloud provider;
• We develop and validate our proposed protocol on a real
private cloud.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we define the proposed approach including a brief explanation
on required concepts, notations, and definitions. In Section III,
the design and implementation of the proposed approach are
given. Discussion and limitations of this study are given in
Section IV. In Section V, the related work is summarized.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the related notations, concepts,
and definitions which are used throughout this paper. We
first define a running example as the main scenario for the
migration of enterprises to the cloud. Then, we deploy the
proposed approach on a real cloud environment [12], [13].
B. Moving to Cloud Scenario
Fig. 2 shows the running example scenario for the proposed
approach based on the migrations of two independent enter-
prises entitled Enterprise-1 (EP1) and Enterprise-2 (EP2) that
presume to reside within a private cloud. Those organisations
decide to cut off the physical equipment and use a private
cloud for accommodating their network infrastructures. Each
organization has launched 8 VMs on the cloud together with
a Database (DB) for creating a virtual network. We assume
that the first 4 VMs use Windows10 instances and the rest are
based on an Ubuntu operating system. The security experts
of the organizations are responsible for the security of their
infrastructures located on the cloud through the servers from
outside of the cloud. The security experts need to perform
the security monitoring and analysis (e.g. risk assessment)
to gain security SA of the cloud, and perform a decision
making and further to select a response for improving the
Fig. 2: Running Example: Infrastructures and threat model and deployed model in the real cloud
security (e.g. by deploying MTD techniques). We implement
the infrastructures of these two organizations on a real private
cloud named UniteCloud [12].
C. Attack Models
We assume that the attackers can launch the attacks as
follows. (i) Exploiting the DB through the attack on the
VN: the attacker can use the vulnerabilities existing on VM
and launches an external attack. The attacker first launches
a remote attack from the Internet to the VMs which are
connected to the Internet. Then, the attacker can find an attack
path and finally exploit the DB. (ii) Accessing a VM through
side-channel: the attacker may try to reconnaissance a goal
and create a VM in the same physical host with the target.
Then, the attackers can benefit from the co-residency issues
and access to the target VM, see Fig. 3. (iii) Communication
link: Attackers can attack the communication link between the
enterprise servers located outside of the cloud and the cloud
provider server on the cloud.
D. Analysis and Defensive Model
In order to thwart the possible attacks on the cloud infras-
tructure, the organizations can obtain the cloud security SA by
Fig. 3: Co-residency and migration example
performing data gathering regarding the possible vulnerabili-
ties, and further risk assessment through the security analysis
from their servers located outside of the cloud and, finally,
select an appropriate threat response. In this paper, we utilized
VM-LM as the main proactive response.
VM-LM can be deployed one time or set periodically (a
Time-based MTD [8]) as the main MTD technique by aiming
to decrease the attacker’s success rate on finding a target on a
physical machine and lower the chance of attacker to locate a
malicious VM in the same machine with the target, see Fig. 3.
It also can reduce the cloud risk and increase the security by
changing the attack surface and make confusion for the attack-
ers [10]. The selected MTD technique should be chosen in a
way that it holds the system risk in an acceptable range. Time-
based MTD approaches deploy MTD technique (in here, VM-
LM) after passing a certain time interval [14]. More frequency
of deploying a VM-LM operation provides more complexity
and difficulties for the attacker to reconnaissance and co-locate
a malicious VM on the same physical host of the target.
Moreover, as the organizations perform the security analysis
and cloud provider deploys the requested MTD strategies,
the collaboration and communication between organizations
and cloud providers should be secure enough. We propose a
security situation awareness framework consisting of security
modeling (situation perception), security analysis (situation
Fig. 4: Situation Awareness Phases: Security Modeling, Anal-
ysis, and Deployment Phases
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: Generated HARM for EP1 and EP2 including OS Vulnerabilities on each VM. (a) The Upper and Lower layers of
HARM. (b) An adjacency lists for EP1 graph.
comprehension), and decision making and deployment phase
(situation projection), as shown in Fig. 4. The security mod-
eling phase includes information gathering and constructing
security models based on the obtained information. Then,
the security analysis (comprehension) phase computes some
security metrics such as the cloud risk to evaluate the overall
cloud security, Return on Attack (RoA) to evaluate security
from the attacker’s perspective, and Mean of Attack Path
Length (MAPL) to observe the attack hardening [10]. Ob-
taining the current situation of the cloud, the security experts
of the organisations can evaluate different response scenarios
to find the best response to deploy. As stated earlier, VM-
LM strategy is used by aiming to make the attack harder and
more confusing. However, VM-LM can be deployed in various
VMs in the cloud. Thus, it is the responsibility in the security
projection phase to find out which VM needs to be selected for
deploying VM-LM so that it has the best effect on the security
while it makes the lower future impact on the system such as
improving or deteriorating the cloud risk. Thus, the defensive
model should analyze the effects of each VM-LM scenario
on the cloud risk so that the cloud risk can be preserved on
an acceptable level after each VM-LM deployment. Finally,
a secure request from the enterprises to the cloud provider’s
server should be sent including the selected VM-LM strategies
for deployment on the cloud. More technical details for the
proposed framework including the design and implementation
are given in the following section.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
We utilize the following concepts and tools to develop
and implement a secure cloud analysis protocol. We utilize
Nessus [15] which is a vulnerability scanning tool, Common
Vulnerabilities Scanning Systems (CVSS), Hierarchical Attack
Representation Model (HARM) [16], OpenStack APIs, .NET
Core, Data-Driven Documents JavaScript (D3.js).
A. Situation Perception using Security modeling
Security modeling is the first phase of the cloud security
framework which can provide a preliminary perception of the
model and its vulnerabilities. The servers at the enterprise
from outside of the cloud are responsible for monitoring and
analysing their infrastructures on the cloud. This phase consists
of two steps: (1) cloud scanning that includes network and
vulnerability scanning, and (2) model creation using HARM.
The details of generating HARM is given in [11]. Cloud
scanning phase uses OpenStack APIs to collect the required
information such as the number of VMs, Hosts, Connectivity
of VMs, etc. Moreover, it captures the vulnerabilities existing
on each VMs through Nessus tool and APIs to automatically
obtain the scan reports [11]. The main results of the first phase
are a set of VMs and the reachabilities of them, and a set
of vulnerabilities (V) existing on each VM. In the next step,
HARM can be constructed using the obtained information.
In this paper, we only extract and parse OS vulnerabilities
from vulnerability scan report for simplicity. However, other
vulnerabilities, such as services, applications, etc., can also
be extracted and incorporated into the model. HARM consists
of two layers which captures VMs and their reachabilities on
the upper layer using Attack Graph (AG) and the existing
vulnerabilities on the lower layer using Attack Tree (AT) [10].
The entry points of the cloud are the VMs connected to the
Internet and the target is the DB. Both entry points and target
are captured in the upper layer of the HARM, see Fig. 5a. The
generated HARM for the running example is represented as
Fig. 6: Situation Perception: Security modeling phase proce-
dures
adjacency lists including an additional node denoted as A for
the attacker. For instance, Fig. 5b shows the adjacency lists of
the upper layer of HARM for EP1.
B. Situation Comprehension and Projection
In this paper, we use risk assessment as one the main
security analysis criteria which can calculate the risk value of
the enterprises’ infrastructure on the cloud. Risk assessment
is actually a systematic and analytical process to consider the
likelihood that a threat can endanger an asset [17]. In this
phase, the result of the generated HARM (denoted as H) is
used as an input for the security analysis and defensive strategy
selection procedures. HARM uses an AG in the upper layer
and a AT in the lower layer. Vulnerabilities are captured on
the lower layer. The vulnerabilities include three main metrics
based on the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [18]:
BaseScore (BS), Exploitability (E), and Impact (I), and Attack
Cost (AC). For instance, there are two vulnerabilities named
as CVE-2018-8490 (V1) with (E = 0.17, I = 6) and CVE-
2018-8484 (V2) with (E = 0.18, I = 5.9) for Windows 10,
and three vulnerabilities for Ubuntu entitled as CVE-2018-
14678 (V3) with (E = 0.18, I = 5.9), CVE-2018-14633 (V4)
with (E = 0.22, I = 4.7), and CVE-2018-15126 (V5) with
(E = 0.22, I = 5.9). The attacker can penetrate into a VM
by exploiting only one of the vulnerabilities, thus, for the AT
Fig. 7: Situation Comprehension and Projection: Security
analysis and strategy selection phase
Algorithm 1: Risk Assessment Procedure (RA): Compu-
tation of risk value
Data: {H} /* H: HARM */
Result: {CR} /* CR: Cloud Risk */
1 begin
2 VM ←Get-VM-List(H)
3 AP ←Get-All-Attack-Paths(H)
4 foreach ap ∈ AP do
5 foreach VMi ∈ ap do
6 CR = CR +R(VMi) /* R(VMi) = Ei × Ii */
7 end
8 end
9 return CR /* Return Total Cloud Risk */
10 end
we use an OR-gate. The risk of exploiting a VM (R(VMi))
can be calculated as the R(VMi) = Ei × Ii, as in [6]. If a
VM includes more than one vulnerability, then the metrics of
the vulnerability having higher severity is used (OR-gate). For
example, the severity of V4 is as 4.7 × 0.22 = 1.03 and this
rate for V5 is almost 1.3. Thus, V5 is used for calculation
of risk for Ubuntu. The following example shows the risk of
exploiting a possible path (highlighted in Fig. 5a) from the
attacker to the DB for EP1.
Example 1. The path risk (PR) value for a single path (ap)
can be computed as sum of the risk associated with each VM
on the path which is as R(VM0) + R(VM2) + R(VM3) +
R(VM5)+R(VM7)+R(DB) = 5.9∗0.18+5.9∗0.18+5.9∗
0.18 + 5.9 ∗ 0.22 + 5.9 ∗ 0.22 + 5.9 ∗ 0.22 = 7.08.
Moreover, we leverage two more security metrics which
helps to gain situation awareness in terms of attacker’s per-
spective such as Return on the Attack (RoA) and Mean of
Attack Path Length (MAPL). The benefit of exploiting the
vulnerabilities on a VM by an attacker is defined as RoA
which can be obtained as RoAi = R(VMi)/(ACi) as in [10].
Moreover, the existence of more number of attack paths (p)
in the cloud indicates less security as the attacker can exploit
alternative paths to reach the target. Thus, the higher MAPL
indicates less security in the network. Equation 1 shows the
calculation for MAPL based on the HARM represented in
Fig. 5., where ap denoted a single attack path and AP shows
a set of all possible attack paths in the cloud.
MAPL =
∑
ap∈AP |ap|
p
(1)
Algorithm 1 shows the procedure of risk assessment in
order to calculate the overall cloud risk based on the gen-
erated HARM. Once the cloud risk value is calculated, the
cloud security framework follows the next step to select a
response strategy in order to defend against the possible
attacks. However, the selected defensive strategy may vary the
cloud risk value. Thus, the strategy should be wisely chosen
so that it holds the cloud risk on an acceptable threshold. This
Algorithm 2: Defensive Strategy Evaluation and Selection
Data: {CR} /* CR: Cloud Risk obtained from risk
assessment step */
Data: countermeasures= {MTD, Patching} /* MTD:
VM-LM */
Result: {S} /* S: The selected VM-LM Strategy */
1 begin
2 VM ←Get-VM-List(H)
3 AP ←Get-All-Attack-Paths(H)
4 foreach vmi ∈ VM do
5 H′ ← MTD(vmi,H) /* Logically deploy VM-LM
in H and returns new HARM H′ */
6 CR′ ← RA(H′) /* CR′: the new cloud risk
value after VL-LM on vmi */
7 Add CR′ into Zi /* Z: CR values list */
8 end
9 i← Select([min(Z)]) /* select a index of Z
with lowest value */
10 S=(VM-LM, VMi) /* S is a tuple */
11 return S /* Return the VM-LM strategy on a
selected VM */
12 end
movement confuses the attacker, as the attacker needs to spend
more time and effort to find out the new location of the target
and place his malicious VM on that physical server. Migration
of VMs may change the VM connectivity and affect the upper
layer of HARM. This procedure considers the migration of
each single VM, and then computes the cloud risk again
repeatedly. The result of this step is a VM-LM strategy which
has the best results in terms of decreasing or keeping the cloud
risk value at an appropriate level which can be determined
by security experts. The defensive strategy evaluation and
selection are given in Algorithm 2. Then, the selected VM-
LM strategy having the best effect on the risk value (denoted
by S) is prepared to send to the cloud provider’s server in
the cloud for deployment on the real cloud. The protocol and
process of establishing secure communication and sending the
VM-LM request will be discussed on the deployment phase in
the following section. Once the cloud provider acknowledges
the organization that VM-LM is successfully deployed, the
HARM is updated for the next iterations. Although the main
goal of this paper is to use VM-LM as the main defensive
strategy against cyber attacks on the cloud, we also consider
the utilization of patching vulnerabilities for the OS vulner-
abilities to compare the VM-LM which is a proactive MTD
technique with a usual response technique which only remove
the detected vulnerability.
We then compare the results obtained from the patching the
OS vulnerabilities and the VM-LM technique, as tabulated
in Table I. We analyze the results of deploying both VM-
LM and patching vulnerabilities to all VMs on the cloud.
The results show that VM-LM technique surpasses patching
vulnerabilities due to the following reasons: (i) The VM-LM
can provide a higher improvement on the cloud risk level,
for example, in the best scenario for EP1, the patching of
TABLE I: The percentages of changes on cloud risk resulting
from security analysis phase for EP1 and EP2 through consid-
ering VM-LM and Patching vulnerabilities (selected strategy
is denoted by (X)).
VM % of Changes (EP1) % of Changes (EP2)
Patching VM-LM S Patching VM-LM S
VM0 -1.65% -27.63% × -4.01% -30.81% ×
VM1 -4.94% -20.05% × -3.00% -16.82% ×
VM2 -3.29% -31.42% × -4.01% -35.42% ×
VM3 -3.29% -7.58% × -6.01% -49.41% ×
VM4 -4.99% -29.33% × -1.52% -26.05% ×
VM5 -7.49% -33.98% × -4.56% -12.20% ×
VM6 -6.24% -42.84% × -8.36% -45.57% ×
VM7 -8.74% -54.64% X -7.60% -54.95% X
the vulnerabilities of VM7 decreases the cloud risk value
by about 8.8%, while this rate for VM-LM is about 54.6%.
Moreover, almost the same rates are observed for after analysis
of EP2, reported in the Table I. (ii) Patching OS vulnerabilities
cannot address the VM co-residency issues, as the malicious
VM is still on the same physical machine of the victim.
(iii) as stated earlier, all vulnerabilities are non-patchable,
or difficult to patch. Accordingly, Fig. 8 represents a radar
charts capturing the situation awareness of the cloud for EP1
based on the security posture obtained from calculation of
CR, RoA, MAPL metrics after deploying VM-LM techniques
and patching vulnerabilities. The results show that deploying
VM-LM yields better security posture in comparison with
patching vulnerability as it decreases all values for RoA, CR,
and MAPL. However, it is also important for the organizations
to always identify and patch the patchable vulnerabilities
alongside with any other defensive strategy like MTD.
C. Deployment Phase and Response
In this phase, the selected MTD technique resulting from
the security analysis phase, given in Section III-B, should be
sent to the cloud provider for real deployment on the cloud’s
infrastructure. The main reason behind this request is the cloud
constraints defined by cloud providers. Some countermeasures
like patching or removing vulnerabilities (like patching OS and
Software vulnerabilities, not hypervisors vulnerabilities) can
be undertaken by the organizations themselves, but most of
the cloud providers do not allow the customers to deploy the
VM-LM strategy on the cloud. Alternatively, cloud providers
TABLE II: Notations used in the paper
Notations Descriptions
~(x) Message digestion function of x (MD5 hash function)
κρ Public key (Asymmetric)
κγ Private key (Asymmetric)
κρ−x Public key of an entity denoted by ’x’
κγ−x Private key of an entity denoted by ’x’
Eρ Asymmetric encryption with a public key
Eγ Asymmetric encryption with a private key
Eρ−x Asymmetric encryption with the public key of ’x’
Eγ−x Asymmetric encryption with the private key of ’x’
κshared Symmetric shared key for both parties
Eκ−shared Symmetric encryption by the shared key
(a) (b)
Fig. 8: Radar charts demonstrating the situation awareness of cloud security posture based on CR, RoA, MAPL metrics after
(a) deploying VM-LM techniques and (b) patching vulnerabilities.
can receive the request from the clouds’ customers and deploy
the VM-LM technique. In this section, we propose a protocol
in order to establish secure communication between cloud
providers and the organizations’ servers. Then, organizations
can securely send their VM-LM request to the cloud provider’s
servers. Authenticating the users, the cloud provider can
deploy the requested VM-LM for authorized organizations.
The defined protocol includes a key exchange scheme for
establishing the connection. The communication between the
enterprises’ servers and the cloud provider’s server undergoes
the following steps. (i) Both parties generate the public and
private keys such that the public key of the cloud provider (CP)
is known by organizations migrated into the cloud. Moreover,
once an organization migrate to the cloud, it receives a secret
enterprise code (EP-code). (ii) The enterprises (EP) prepare a
request message including the EP-code and the organization’s
public key, then the message is encrypted by the cloud
provider’s public key and sent to the cloud provider’s server,
see Equation 2. Table II shows some notations and descriptions
used in this section.
Registration Request = Eρ−CP[EP-code + κρ−EP] (2)
Next, once the cloud server receives the request message
and perform the authentication process, it obtains the user’s
public key included in the request message and creates a
symmetric shared key (κshared) for the organization. Then, the
server creates a reply message and replies it to the organization
as Equation 3.
Reply Message = Eρ−EP[κshared] + ACK+ (3)
Eγ−CP[nonce+ ~(all fields)]
Then, once the organization receives the reply message, it
performs the authentication process using decryption of the
third part of the reply message using the cloud provider’s
public key and comparing the fields. The organization obtains
the shared key and acknowledgment for the registration. Later
on, the communication between the organization and the cloud
provider is based on the shared key. The messages for further
communication from client to cloud are as Equation 4.
Further Message = Eκ-shared[S]+ (4)
Eγ−EP[nonce+ ~(all fields)]
Authenticating the message, the cloud provider’s server uses
the shared key to decrypt the message containing the requested
strategy (denoted by S in Equation 4), and then deploys the
requested VM-LM strategy on the cloud. Finally, the cloud
provider acknowledges the organization about the success or
failure of the action.
IV. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Security situation awareness monitoring capabilities play an
important role for finding the security holes on the cloud envi-
ronment and making decision about the appropriate defensive
responses. We propose a secure protocol which can help the
organizations to have their own security monitoring and risk
assessment for their assets on the cloud and deploy the defen-
sive strategies on the cloud from the servers which are located
outside of the cloud. When the new vulnerabilities and threats
are discovered, the key steps for the organizations are to assess
the risk, then establish appropriate security countermeasures
like patching the newly founded vulnerabilities or deploying
MTD techniques to decrease the threats. We implement our
framework in the real private cloud and analyze the cloud risk
from outside of the cloud. The experimental results of the first
round of running the protocol is reported in Fig. 8 and Table I.
The results compare the patching vulnerabilities and VM-LM
as the defensive techniques and demonstrate that deploying
VM-LM is more effective than patching vulnerabilities based
on the cloud risk values together with RoA and MAPL which
are metrics from the attacker’s perspective. Moreover, patching
vulnerabilities cannot avoid co-residency issues while VM-LM
can address co-residency problems [19].
However, the communication portion of the proposed proto-
col provides the main security services ensuring the confiden-
tiality and integrity of the messages, and also authentication
of parties. The adversary cannot attack the communication
protocol to read, forge, or alter the request messages including
the VM-LM strategy because the messages are encrypted by
a symmetric shared key together with a hash value of all
messages’ fields signed by the enterprises’ private key. The
value of nonce is also added to the signed portion of the
message to avoid the reply attack. We also include a key
exchange scheme on the protocol in order to securely exchange
public key of the organizations to the cloud and receive the
shared key from the cloud provider (as in Equations 2 and 3).
Limitations. The proposed protocol for deploy the VM-LM
can be done periodically, but in this paper we only evaluate one
round of response deployment. Moreover, VM-LM can also be
adopted based on the responses to the events and security alerts
t make it more promising defensive technique. For example,
once an intrusion is detected on a physical server using the
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), then an event for triggering
VM-LM operation can be raised. However, we will further
consider event-based VM-LM deployment in our future work.
V. RELATED WORK
Cloud security problems have been studying in various
studies [3], [20], [21]. Mreover, the application of situation
awareness in the cloud also have been widely studied [22],
[23], [24]. In [22], the authors proposed a cloud computing
based network monitoring and threat detection system to
secure the critical infrastructure of the cloud using monitoring
agents, cloud infrastructure, and an operation center. In another
study [23], the authors proposed a cloud computing based
architecture for conducting cyber space situation awareness
and leveraged the cloud infrastructure with a cost-effective
data storage and investigated efficient threat detection tech-
niques. Moreover, In [24], the authors proposed a situational
awareness method in cloud computing environment using a
security analysis node named target virtual machine (TVM)
and evaluated the impact of attack behavior on TVM by virtual
machine introspection (VMI). However, the proposed methods
have not considered situation comprehension and projection to
make a decision and deploy an effective response to enhance
the security. Moreover, most of the proposed methods have
not been implemented on real cloud environment.
In [21], authors investigated on the multi-tenancy problem
and co-residency attacks, they reported that there is a high
chance for attackers to find and locate their VMs into the
same physical server of the victim even in the public cloud
with various datacenters and physical servers. Moreover, a
number of side channels have been explored [25], [26] in
order to transfer sensitive information between VMs, which is
prohibited by security policies. However, most of the existing
research work on theoretical aspects of the cloud security
problems.
Li et al. [27] proposed a virtual machine replacement
strategy based on the security risk on the cloud by considering
migration time and computing costs, but they didn’t consider
the security analysis using the security models and also their
strategy is not optimal in terms of migration.
Cloud security analysis through considering MTD tech-
niques are also investigated by researchers [28], [9], [29].
In [6], the authors introduced three main MTD categories
and analyzed the effectiveness of each technique on the cloud
through simulation. In [30], the authors proposed a threat-
specific risk assessment for the cloud which allows the security
administrator of the cloud provider to make decisions for se-
lecting mitigation strategies in order to protect the computing
resources of the clients based on the specific security needs
and various threats. However, the process of security analysis
is performed by the cloud providers. In our proposed approach,
we design a secure automated protocol as a platform enabling
the IT security experts of the enterprises to analyze the security
of their infrastructures on the cloud through their servers from
outside the cloud which can offer more flexibility and trust to
the organisations.
Moreover, most of the proposed MTD techniques for the
cloud lack real cloud implementation, and they are mostly
theoretical and simulation-based. Furthermore, the existing
approaches only proposed the devising techniques for VM
allocation and migrations in order to find the best performance
or achieve a security level, but they do not consider the cloud
providers constraints, like restriction on deploying VM-LM
technique on the cloud by cloud customers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Cloud security issues are the biggest challenge for enter-
prises avoiding them to migrate into the cloud. Although the
cloud providers consider some security mechanisms, the or-
ganizations also need their own security monitoring, analysis,
and defensive mechanism to keep their migrated infrastructure
secure and safe in the cloud. VM-LM feature of the cloud
has been used in many studies as an effective technique that
can improve cloud’s security. However, most of the cloud
providers restrict this feature for their clients. We proposed a
framework for organizations migrated into the cloud enabling
them: (i) to obtain the security situation awareness of their
infrastructures in the cloud. (ii) to plan and select a desirable
response strategy such as VM-LM technique to reduce risk and
defend against the malicious co-resident VMs. (iii) to securely
request a desirable VM-LM strategy to the cloud provider’s
server for real deployment.
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